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During the months preceding the last two Greek parliamentary elections of 6 May and 17 June 2012, for many on
the left hopes ran high for a substantive challenge to neoliberal discourse and practice that could potentially revert
EU economic policy itself. Except from the strictly partisan, most of these wished good results for both of the main
parts of the Greek radical left – the Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA) and the Greek Communist Party (KKE). At
the end, only the former triumphed, while the latter experienced initially a less than modest rise of 0.94% (in the first
election) and then (in the second election) a decrease of 3.98% and the lowest result in its history (4.50%). While
SYRIZA’s ascent has already attracted much analysis, the KKE’s descent has been either dismissed as
unimportant, or hastily explained with references to rhetorical boxes – dogmatism, left extremism, irrationality,
sectarianism – devoid of theoretical reflection. Yet, a closer look suggests otherwise, as well as invites questions
over communist and radical left party strategy in periods of economic crisis.
All those who have preoccupied themselves with the KKE in the past two or so decades, or have had even a
passing glimpse at its physiognomy seem to agree upon at least one thing: that the KKE has not changed in terms of
ideology and policy. Consequently, if it has not changed in a period of twenty years (not to mention the whole of the
period before its 1988-1991 coalition with SYN – SYRIZA’s main component – and its simultaneous participation in
two consecutive governments) but only just now, in the last Greek election of 17 June 2012 its share of the vote was
halved, then voters must have expected it to change amid changing circumstances. So far, all are still in agreement.
Let us remember the facts. The economy was (and still is) on the brink of collapse, living standards decreased
sharply, social insecurity erupted into unrest; an anti-German and partly anti-imperialist sentiment, albeit largely
underpinned by nationalism and not simply class consciousness flourished in Greek society; the mainstream
parties, PASOK and New Democracy lost credibility and votes, and experienced serious internal fragmentation; the
extreme right, Golden Dawn, showed clear signs that it could enter parliament for the first time; and SYRIZA
proposed cooperation with the KKE under the prospects of what it envisaged as an alternative, radical left
government, and started climbing high in the polls. So circumstances did change but why didn’t the KKE?
At first sight, it may seem that the KKE’s conduct cannot be grasped by almost any theory of party politics. Most
commentary trying to explain the KKE’s ideological and policy continuity has thus far focused on the ‘usual suspects’
that haunt even the most prominent academic analyses of the party’s trajectory: its miscalculation during the
campaign about vote losses, which is part of a broader ill-informed approach that views continuity, irrespective of
context, as the only way to maintain and increase electoral appeal; an ideological dogmatism that embodies a
narrow-minded, almost obsessive vilification of SYRIZA; and the fear of its core leadership that government
participation, or even just a halt to intense antagonism with the other radical left would loosen their stronghold over
the organization.
Here, I would like to disagree and put forward an alternative explanation. The KKE is not an irrational actor, with a
sui generis dogmatism, a complete inability to predict its electoral fate and a leadership blinded by its own power.
Being dogmatic means little in party politics and is by definition a characteristic of parties that – unlike the KKE’s
tradition of saying a lot on everything – produce scarce and superficial ideological analyses. The real questions
suggested by the plenty that we know about how political parties function are what a party’s goal(s) are, how and
when they can be achieved in a given situation and why a specific strategy to achieve them is judged to be better
than others.
Secondly, the KKE could certainly foretell its bad result (if not the actual numbers, then their gist), chiefly because of
its strong organizational power and its tendency to hold frequent internal polls. Speaking in Chalkida approximately
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a week before the second election of 17 June, KKE General Secretary, Aleka Papariga said: “Ten days before the
election of 6 May, polls showed that we had double digit percentages and we lost votes when we revealed what a
government of the left would mean, we expected the loss, think, however, of the cost if we had said ‘yes’ … a
temporary cost can be reverted when the justice of its position is proven, a durable political mistake, however,
cannot be corrected easily and you pay for it for years” (To Vima, 11 June 2012). There seems to have been wide
acknowledgement of the above described argument inside the KKE. With one exemption, in the form of a recently
constructed blog publishing purportedly internal criticism of the party and its leadership, the KKE seems to have
been cohesive and united in its last two electoral campaigns.
The whispers about dissenting voices, the rumors about a possible split and the speculation about the leadership
being undermined are not vindicated by facts so far. Nor do they reflect the true nature of the ongoing discussion
within the circles of the party about whether it diverged from the programmatic goals of  its 15th Congress. Not that
internal upset is impossible, or can easily reach the public eye. But a Central Committee assessment of the result
that “calls on those people who this time preferred to vote for other parties instead of the KKE and especially for
SYRIZA to think hard on this even if it is in retrospect”, is, to say the least, unlikely to reflect, or be the product of
marked differences in opinion about stratagem.
Resistance to change by the KKE is part of a broader approach of relying less on the electoral arena and more on
the societal one and ideology. A number of otherwise unexplained choices by the Greek communists attest to this:
the fact that Papariga has consistently ranked very low in Greek political leaders popularity polls throughout her time
as KKE General Secretary but no move to substitute her has been made; the more than ten years old strategy of
giving primacy to KKE-controlled trade union, All Workers Militant Front (PAME) over the parliamentary group; the
resources and time spent on cooperation with minuscule but orthodox formations across Europe and beyond, at the
expense of any kind of attempt to reach over to the more ‘mainstream’ radical left that has more potential to
contribute to domestic legitimization.
The Greek communists realize that they can achieve very little in parliament and in government and at the same
time that, in order to achieve the little that they can, they will have to undergo the risk of losing any kind of
trustworthiness and potentially seeing their vote share drop even more drastically than it already has. If the KKE had
decided to declare its willingness to form a government with SYRIZA and whoever else might have been interested
to chip in for a radical left majority to be sustained, or even simply support it without official participation, then such a
government would have been more likely than not to be formed. But the KKE already had a similar experience in
1989-1990 and still suffers from it. A protest party the KKE may be, but it is also one whose mobilization in work
places, universities, trade unions, local committees and other forms of its own, patiently crafted civil society can
yield results in terms of social capital; results that are more tangible and imperative for its future than any kind of
maneuvering within state institutions.
With very few exceptions, the results of radical left party participation in, or support of government have always had
a common denominator across time and space: the radical left compromises and loses votes, only to return back to
opposition weakened, confused and divided (see Olsen, J., Koβ, M. and Hough, D. (eds) (2010) Left parties in
national governments. Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan).
In hindsight, the KKE’s choice in the last Greek election was not one between disaster and success but one
between different forms of disaster. It chose electoral disaster over a potentially more enduring, multi-faceted and
uncertain one. If I was a party, I might have done the same.
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